[redacted]

ily-grams" are allowed only four times during each 60-day patrol, and there can be no replies from the radio-silent, prowling ship.

The night's realistic training exercise completed, the Carver surfaced shortly after midnight.

Clumps of tiny, phosphorescent sea-creatures glowed like fireflies, and even Roman candles, in the surf, racing across the bow as the Carver headed homeward to Norfolk.

And a lone, leaping dolphin gleamed in the ship's light off the port side as the lookout, Seaman Robert Abreu, 21, of Westford, Mass., confided he was homesick for his family and his girl.

"My birthday was Oct. 12," he said, "and for the last three years, I've spent it on patrol."

"Tough luck!" the newsman agreed. "But at least you have much in common with Columbus."

PRESIDENT NIXON'S ACTIONS IN VIETNAM APPROVED BY TWO ARIZONA NEWSPAPERS

HON. JOHN J. RHODES

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, both of the major Phoenix newspapers, the Arizona Republic and the Phoenix Gazette, printed excellent editorials today regarding President Nixon's most recent actions in Southeast Asia.

I would like to share the wisdom of these editorials with my colleagues, and suggest we all listen to this reasoned approach to the present situation. I therefore, insert both editorials in the RECORD at this point.

[From the Arizona Republic, May 10, 1972]

NIXON'S DUAL ESCALATION

President Nixon's speech Monday night undoubtedly escalated American participation in the Vietnam war. What many of the President's listeners didn't realize, however, is that the speech also escalated the drive for peace. It probably was the bravest speech ever made by an American president, and it showed the only course that promises n honorable end to the war.

Mining of North Vietnamese harbors involves a calculated risk. But it also promises to shut off supplies for North Vietnam, and 85 per cent of the tanks, artillery and guns used so effectively by North Vietnam are delivered by ship.

At the time he announced his blockade of North Vietnam, the President also went farther than he has ever gone to meet the peace demands of the Hanoi government.

With the complete support of liberal opinion in this country, Hanoi has repeatedly said it would return the American prisoners if the United States (a) stopped fighting and (b) announced a fixed date by which all American military forces would be withdrawn from Vietnam.

Monday night President Nixon said he would agree to withdraw all American military forces within four months of (a) the return of American prisoners and (b) the establishment of an internationally supervised cease-fire.

So it is obvious that President Nixon has now come very close to accepting the Hanoi demands for an end to the war. He threw in the blockade for two reasons, it seems to us. First, he will have something to bargain with if Hanoi agrees to meaningful talks. Second, the South Vietnamese will be in a much stronger position to continue the war if enemy supplies of oil, tanks, guns, planes and ammunition are cut off.

There is, of course, a risk involved in ordering the interdiction of enemy supplies within the territorial waters of North Vietnam. What happens when the first non-combatant freighter, say a Russian ship, starts up the river for Haiphong? U.S. planes may bomb it, or U.S. ships may warn the Russian captain that he is entering a minefield. In either case, the supplies will not be delivered and the provisions of international law will have been complied with.

The President's hand was, of course, forced by the new missile and artillery attacks on American military bases in South Vietnam. Had he made no response the 80,000 American troops still in South Vietnam (most of them supply troops) might well have been faced with a Dunkerque of appalling proportions.

Cutting the Russian arms supply to North Vietnam assures the American command that it can continue its orderly withdrawal without running the risk of a slaughter on the beaches. To have done less would have made President Nixon guilty of neglecting his duty (1) to the American soldiers still in Vietnam, (2) to the prisoners still being used as pawns by the North Vietnamese, and (3) to the 17 million South Vietnamese whose capture is the goal of the Communist regime of North Vietnam.

[From the Phoenix Gazette, May 9, 1972]

TO WIN THE PEACE

When predator nations are on the prowl, most often peace can be achieved only by fighting for it.

Or by showing beyond even a fool's doubting the willness to fight.

America's Quaker President, whose very religion binds him to the cause of peace, who has gone the last mile with an arrogant enemy in seeking it, who has offered compromises so deeply cutting that they have lost him the good will of the far right in his own party—this President last night told his people, and the people of the whole world, that he intends to fight for peace.

Not for a false and transient peace born of surrender, that could have no other ultimate end but greater war.

A peace of honor, born of respect, sustained by strength.

In President Nixon's address to the nation last night was the implicit knowledge that there are two ways in which a great nation can fight. One is to win a victory. The other is to win a peace. The first seeks to humble and destroy the enemy. The second seeks only to bring the enemy to end the fighting.

By ordering the blockade and mining of North Vietnam's ports and the rail lines which bring in war supplies. Mr. Nixon entered into a great gamble that the Soviet Union would not react aggressively. But by going no farther at this time, he signaled to anyone who might listen that it is peace he seeks—not conquest and not a victory of conquest.

It should not be lost on anyone, and surely by now must not be lost upon the Communist world, that Mr. Nixon has meant what he has said from the beginning of his administration: He does not intend to surrender in this war; he does not intend to stand aside so that our ally can be first humiliated, then destroyed.

In our opinion Mr. Nixon has now done what President Kennedy and Johnson should have done, each in his turn.

Left undone in the proper time, it made the doing now vastly more difficult.

But no less necessary.

ESCALATION, AMERICAN OPTIONS, AND PRESIDENT NIXON'S WAR MOVES

[redacted]

HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, today I am joining with several of my colleagues in sponsoring a resolution of impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon.

Given the President's actions in recent days—indeed, over the entire term of his office—and given the type of information now available about the options he faced, I have concluded that he is guilty of both unconstitutional procedure and of crimes against humanity.

President Nixon thinks he can get away with anything. I do not. The real question is whether the Congress will justify his contemptuous opinion of it, or whether Congress will start doing its job. The President fools only himself in believing his grandstanding can solve problems. Those of us in Congress must have a greater sense of reality—and a great sense of responsibility both to the Americans who are pawns in Mr. Nixon's games, and to the Vietnamese whose society we are turning into a smoking ruin.

I am amazed by the cynical irresponsibility with which the President presumes to blackmail the American people. Is he so obsessed with his personal prestige and power, is he so removed from the human realities of his decisions, that he no longer cares how many lives he endangers through his cruel and reckless actions? After wantonly exposing American troops and installations and the lives of American POW's, he then tries to use their endangered position—for which he alone is responsible—as a weapon to silence criticism. After flounting international law and daring the Russians to forget about their national honor, their ability to help their allies, their fears of appearing a pitiful, helpless giant. I, for one, do not think the Russians are more saintly than the Americans—I think they will respond as we have, with aggressive belligerence. And their victims will be the same innocent people trapped in Indochina.

In the last year of the Second World War, after the Germans knew they were defeated, they went on an orgy of killing that exceeded the horrors of the earlier part of the war, haunting the conscience of mankind ever since. This is the choice that faces us now. No longer able to impose our will in Southeast Asia, will our removal be in the same frenzied manner? Or will the American people get down to the job of preventing the needless sacrifice of lives and of preserving the sense of honor that is sickened by senseles and cruel destruction?

In the 48 hours since Mr. Nixon made his speech to the American public, my offices here in Washington and in California have been deluged with calls and telegrams responding to the President's

[redacted]

HARTFORD, CONN.
COURANT
MAY 10 1972

STATINTL

M - 152,528
S - 199,160

Weicker Shifts Position, Backs Cutting Off Asian War Funds

By WILLIAM COCKERHAM

U.S. Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr., R-Conn., reacting to President Nixon's decision to mine North Vietnam harbors, announced Tuesday that he will now support legislation to cut off funds for American operations in Southeast Asia after the end of the year.

"It will be said that this reaction cares not a whit for either the North Vietnamese or the South Vietnamese. That is exactly what it is intended to say," Weicker said.

In other reactions from state leaders, U.S. Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff, D-Conn., said he is afraid Nixon's decision could lead to a dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union and China. J. Brian Gaffney, state Republican chairman, said Nixon's "courage to face the issue and act upon it" makes him proud to be an American.

Reverses Earlier Stand

Weicker, who had previously voted against Senate efforts to cut off funds, said in a statement from Washington, "I intend to support such legislation as may come before the Senate which would preclude further funding for American operations in and over Indochina after Dec. 31 of this year, or at the end of the four-month period contained in the President's peace proposal, whichever date is sooner."

The Connecticut Republican, however, reiterated his support of Nixon in all the steps he has taken in Vietnam to date, including those announced Monday night, "because I share with him a primary concern over the withdrawal in safety of American troops from South Vietnam."

U.S. Rep. William R. Cotter, D-1st Dist., a staunch opponent of the war, said, "I hesitate to think what our next military action will be when this latest venture fails to bail out the South Vietnamese Army.

"It is apparent that Nixon is unable to end our participation in this war," Cotter said.

Cotter said he would continue his own efforts to end the war in Vietnam, subject only to the release of American prisoners of war.

U.S. Rep. Robert H. Steele, R-2d Dist., said the Nixon decision to mine the harbors will exert "enormous pressure" on Soviet leaders not to back down as Premier Nikita Khrushchev did in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. He said, however, that most of his congressional colleagues would urge the North Vietnamese to accept Nixon's offer of withdrawing all U.S. troops after an internationally supervised cease fire.

U.S. Rep. Ella T. Grasso, D-6th Dist., said Nixon's move meant the "death of this myth of Vietnamization."

U.S. Rep. John S. Monagan, D-5th Dist., said it is "questionable that the President's decision advances" the objective of a withdrawal from Indochina.

Escalation Cited

U.S. Rep. Robert Giaimo, D-3d Dist., said the decision to mine North Vietnamese ports "has dramatically escalated the stakes" in the war, which could easily lead to a dangerous confrontation with other Communist countries.

U.S. Rep. Stewart B. McKinney, R-4th Dist., said Monday night's announcement by Nixon was "the gravest move of the entire war." He declines, however, to make any further comment until he has more information.

Gov. Meskill said the American people should support Nixon's position and said no more.

Lt. Gov. T. Clark Hull, however, said the escalation of the war is "wrong," whether it is done by a Republican or Democratic president.

Roger Hilsman, former assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs and an announced candidate for the Democratic nomination for the 2nd District congressional seat, said Nixon's decision is "a rash and dangerous act."

Hilsman added that he resigned from his former State Department position because he disagreed with the Vietnam policy of former President Lyndon B. Johnson.

He said Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) studies have revealed that the North Vietnamese will be able to bring in more than 8,000 tons of war supplies a day over its rail and road network even if a blockade of North Vietnamese ports is successful, and despite increased bombings.

Joseph D. Duffey, a Yale professor and member of the National Democratic Policy Committee, said the Nixon decision "gravely threatens any prospect for an end to U.S. involvement in Vietnam."

Condemns Move

John Ratliff, Socialist Workers party candidate for Congress from the 3d District, condemned Nixon's move to mine Haiphong harbor and pledged that he would continue to build massive demonstrations "demanding the immediate withdrawal" of all U.S. forces from Indochina.

The Manchester Community College Faculty Senate voted 25-20 Tuesday on a resolution censuring President Nixon's action.

"We are shocked and angered by President Nixon's drastic escalation of the war and call for public censure of President Nixon."

They also called for strong Congressional action "to limit the President's unconstitutional usurpation of war powers in actions which jeopardize our national security and bring us to serious confrontation with the Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China."

James Gardner, a lecturer in English at Manchester Community College, said the 20 votes against the resolution were not over the message, "but the harshness of the language."

WASHINGTON STAR
10 MAY 1972

[redacted]

1969 ADVICE TO NIXON

CIA Doubtful on Port Mining

By MORTON KONDRACKE
and THOMAS B. ROSS
Chicago Sun-Times Service

ger said it had been "carefully

President Nixon was advised by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1969 that the type of action he now has ordered to cut off supplies to North Vietnam would not work.

"Within two or three months," the CIA declared in a secret memo, "North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports."

The State Department and the Defense Department were less pessimistic. But both conceded that the effort to prevent resupply through alternative land routes from China would involve much heavier bombing and a much higher risk of civilian casualties.

The estimates of the three agencies are contained in National Security Memorandum 1 (NSSM-1), a secret study of the war compiled by the President's national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger.

Gravel Reads Memo

This section of the memo was read into the Congressional Record on the Senate floor yesterday by Sen. Mike Gravel, D-Alaska, although two weeks ago he had been blocked by Republicans from doing so. Copies of the memo also have been obtained and their contents reported by some newspapers recently.

Asked about the CIA's gloomy forecast at a press conference yesterday, Kissinger said it had been "carefully considered" but that Nixon also had before him recent and "much more detailed studies," which he implied were more optimistic.

In the 1969 study, Kissinger asked: "What are current views on proportion of war-essential imports that could come into NVN (North Vietnam) over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and strong effort even made to interdict ground transport?"

The CIA replied: "All the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied. . . ."

Pessimistic View

"Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown — as did the Korean war — that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours . . .

"An intensive and sustained air interdiction program could have a good chance of reducing the northern rail capacity by at least half. However, roads are less vulnerable to interdiction, and waterways even less so . . .

"In addition to the overland capacity, an airlift from chinese airfields could potentially provide a means for importing a large volume of high-priority goods. Moreover, total interdiction of seaborne imports would be difficult because shallow-draft lighters could be used to unload cargo from oceangoing ships anchored in waters outside the mined major harbor areas."

The State Department commented: "we do not believe that the capacity of the DRV-PRC (North Vietnam-China) road and rail network is great enough to permit an adequate flow of supplies in the face of an intense day and night bombing campaign . . .

"On the other hand, one important point should be kept in mind. The North Vietnamese surprised many observers, and confounded many predicitions, by holding together and simultaneously sending ever-increasing amounts of supplies and personnel into the South during 3½ years of bombing . . .

"With this experience in mind, there is little reason to believe that new bombing will accomplish what previous bombing failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism and risk of escalation."

The Defense Department declared: "An interdiction campaign . . . when employed in conjunction with denial of sea imports, would, in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of the country."

Decision to Mine Harbors Was Made Long Ago

STATINTL

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star Staff Writer

The die had been cast for the decision to mine North Vietnam's ports and to smash her supply and communications facilities long before the orders were flashed to the fleet at 2 p.m. Monday or before President Nixon told the world that evening what he had done.

There is no way to fix the precise hour or the exact day precise time Nixon made his decision. Very likely the possibility of having to decide to do something drastic began to close in on the President Easter Sunday when he first knew for sure that North Vietnam had launched a full-scale offensive across the Demilitarized Zone.

He ran out of time at some point last weekend when it became evident that the Russians had done nothing to restrain their ally and when the administration concluded that the all-out offensive had become a threat to the safety of the 60,000 Americans still in South Vietnam.

Some of the timetable of the decision-making process was disclosed yesterday by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national security affairs adviser. Other details became known from other sources at the White House with the thunpartment and the Pentagon.

The crisis did not descend on the White Housew ith the thunersdtorm speed of the Cuban missile confrontation.

Nixon's decision, on the other hand, was made after nearly a decade of war and after six months of trying to set up new meetings with the enemy to end the conflict.

"It was not sudden, and evweighed," a White House weighde," a White House Source said. "For several days, the process was one of constant thinking and talking."

Nixon ruled out the use of nuclear weapons. He also decided against the reintroduction of U.S. ground forces although he has an entire Marine division poised on Okinawa and at sea off the Vietnam coast.

On Friday, May 5, at 4:10 p.m., Nixon boarded his helicopter and flew off to his Camp David retreat in Maryland's Catoctin Mountains to ponder the final decision.

The option of mining the harbors and sealing off North Vietnam from supplies by a naval cordon was not new and the means were ready to Nixon's hand. The idea had been advanced 10 years ago but never used.

The President spent a lot of time alone, walking the solitary Mountain paths and thinking deeply on the magnitude of what he had to do. At Camp David he wrote part of the 18-minute speech that eventually was delivered Monday night.

An inside source said the section he concentrated on over the weekend was the part in which he addressed special messages to the leaders of the nations most involved.

Portions of the decision were made in the mountains. There was to be a meeting of the National Security Council Monday morning. The participants had to be notified.

One of these was Secretary of State William P. Rogers, called back abruptly from an official European visit.

Rogers had made his stops in Reykjavik, London and Luxembourg and was about to spend a Sunday boating on the Rhine when word reached him in Bonn to come home.

Rogers canceled his meetings with the West Germans, the French, the Italians and the Spaniards and landed at Andrews Air Force Base, Sunday night at about the same time Nixon got back to the White House from Camp David.

At 9:10 a.m. Monday, the security council gathered in the Cabinet Room. There were no outsiders present. With Nixon were Vice President Spiro Agnew, Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and George A. Lincoln, director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, all statutory members of the council.

As always at NSC meetings, also present were Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Treasury Secretary John B. Connally and press spokesman Ronald Ziegler also sat in.

Basic Decision

It has not been divulged whether Nixon went into the security council with a decision made or whether he still kept options open and sought the council's help.

The most informed speculation, based on Nixon's style of conducting the presidency, is that he had his mind made up on the basic decision. This implies that the council had the role of refining his decision with suggestions, ideas, cautionary expressions. If there was dissent, it has not surfaced.

(The New York Times News Service reported today that Nixon followed that NSC session by meeting with Kissinger and Connally for some final thoughts. During the previous week, the Times said, Nixon had talked often with those two advisers—with Kissinger about strategy, with Conally about philosophy and America's role in the world.

By 2 p.m., Moorer and Laird had relayed the detailed orders to the sizable U.S. Navy force. The rules of engagement were set forth.

Nixon went back to his speech and worked on it through the afternoon. The White House said he wrote most of it himself as he does when he has something of importance to announce.

His speech-writers hovered around and did some touching up but it was a Nixon speech, indentifiable as such by simplicity of phrase and a disconcerting directness when the one-two-three of decision emerges.

Ulcers Triggered

At 3 p.m., the White House press office contacted the radio-television networks to ask for air time and the late editions [illegible] informed Americans that the President would address the nation at 9 p.m. This produced the standard scurrying of technicians and triggered the ulcers of program directors across the land.

At 5 p.m., the White House announced that the President had asked Congressional leaders to meet with him at 8 p.m., an hour before air time, so he could brief them on what he intended to say. The Democratic and Republican leaders of the Senate and House came as invited, heard from Nixon for a time and were turned over to Moorer, Laird and Rogers who answered questions. Nixon went to the Oval Room to get ready.

While he was speaking, the Navy was already at work seeding the waters of North Vietnam with mines. It was early in the day on the other side of the world and the decision-maker went to bed while his orders were being carried out.